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THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES IN RETROSPECT 
Some Reflections on Causes and Effects 
by Yale Kamisar 
Lord, we ain't what we oughta be, 
we ain't what we wanna be, 
we ain't what we gonna be but, 
thank God, we ain't what we was. 
~ The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
quoting an old southern preacher. 
Recently, when asked to give a lecture on appellate advocacy, Justice Thur-
good Marshall reminded his audience what Judge Benjamin Cardozo had once 
said: "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside 
in their course and pass judges by." 1 An outstanding example, he might have 
added, is Brown v. Board of Education. 
In a sense, the significant changes which have occurred in the Black man's 
status in the last two decades had their beginnings in the rise of numerically, and 
hence politically, important Black communities in the North. For the importance 
of civil rights for the Black-and his political power to enhance these rights at the 
national level-has increased as he has moved northward and cityward. ~ 
The Great Depression and the New Deal, as historian Alfred Kelly has noted, 
"nationalized the Negro's political significance int~ 'great cities of the North by 
incorporating the colored voter as an e~sential i,ngredient in the new political 
machine which Franklin Roosevelt put together after 1933," and "for the first time 
since Reconstruction, the Negro had a'recognifed position in a winning political 
combination of national scope." World War fl accelerated the growth of Black 
power and influence by creating an enormous demand for Black labor in northern 
cities. And this increase in power and influence led to the revival of a Black 
dream-"first-class citizenship" in an integrated nation. 1 
World War II had other consequences for the Black man in America. The 
'Thurgood Marshall, "The Federal Appeal," in Charpentier ed., Counsel on Appeal 
141, 143 (New York, 1968), quoting from Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process 168 (New Haven, 1921). 
'See Alfred H. Kelly, "The School Desegregation Case," in Garraty ed., Quarrels that 
Have Shaped the Nation 243, 246-47 (New York, 1966) (Harper Colophon ed.); C. V. 
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 115-117 (New York, 1957) (Galaxy Book 
ed.). 
1 Kelly, supra note 2, at 247. 
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"equalitarian ideology" of war propaganda, depicting democratic America bat-
tling racist Nazi Germany, must have instilled in the minds and hearts of not a few 
white Americans "a new and intense awareness of the shocking contrast between 
the country's too comfortable image of itself and the cold realities of America's 
racial segregation.", No sooner had the Axis powers been defeated than we found 
ourselves contesting Russia for the friendship of the world's great colored 
races~and feeling the sting of Communist propaganda about racial discrimina-
tion and injustice in "the land of democracy." The establishing of the United 
Nations headquarters on our shores "suddenly threw open to the outside world a 
large window on American race practices." What delegates from all nations and 
races saw for themselves, and the publicity generated by U.N. committees of 
investigation and public debates on racial inequality, "caused genuine and practi-
cal embarrassment to the State Department in the conduct of foreign affairs_,,-, 
The United States Attorney General, in a brief filed in December of 1952 in con-
nection with the School Segregation cases, told the Supreme Court: 
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny 
that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed .... Racial discrimina-
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even 
among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith. 
During and after World War II, it became increasingly apparent that racial 
equality was becoming an objective of our national policy. The Roosevelt admin-
istration expanded federal employment of Blacks, wrote "no discrimination" 
clauses into war contracts, and established a Fair Employment Practices Commis-
sion. President Truman's Commission on Higher Education condemned inequal-
ity of opportunity on account of race, and his Committee on Civil Rights urged 
the elimination of racial segregation from American life. And in 1948, Truman 
issued executive orders designed to eliminate discrimination in federal employ-
ment and to end segregation in the armed services. 
By the time Brown and its companion cases had reached the Supreme Court, 
the order to achieve "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the 
armed services" had been thoroughly carried out in Korea, Japan, Germany, and 
in the camps and bases of the Deep South. "For the full impact of the results 
one needs the picture supplied by Lee Nichols of a company barracks at Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina, where, 'busily cleaning their rifles, Negroes from Mis-
sissippi and Arkansas sat on double-decker bunkers among whites from Georgia 
and South Carolina with no apparent antipathy.' "" With hundreds of thousands 
of young Americans entering and leaving the armed services every year, the 
impact of unsegregated military life on civilian life since the early I950's probably 
was enormous. 
On the judicial front, the "separate but equal" doctrine, for which the 1896 
case of Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) had come to stand, was being 
weakened by a series of cases in the field of higher education. 
'Id. at 248. See also Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
224 (Bantam Books ed. 1968); John Roche, Courts and Rights 88-89 (New York, 1961); 
Woodward, supra note 2, at 119. 
··woodward, supra note 2, at 119-22. 
"Id. at 139. 
THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES IN RETROSPECT xv 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ( 1938) held that a state could 
not satisfy the test of separate but equal by offering to pay the tuition of a Black 
applicant to its law school at an out-of-state school of equally high standing: "The 
white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident 
having the same qualifications is refused it there and must go outside the State to 
obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the pri-
vilege which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees 
in another State does not remove the discrimination."' Although the State argued 
in Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 ( 1948) that the State Regents 
was required by local law to provide a separate law school for Blacks upon 
demand or notice, and that petitioner had failed to seek relief from or against state 
officials who had to provide it, the Court, undoubtedly aware of the inevitable 
delay that establishing a new law school would involve, was unmoved: "The peti-
tioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. To this 
time, it has been denied her although during the same period many white appli-
cants have been afforded legal education by the State. The State must provide it 
for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group."H 
Oklahoma was back in the Supreme Court two years later. A Black student 
had been admitted to graduate instruction in a state university, but, pursuant to 
new state law, on a "segregated basis." Thus, for some time the section of the 
classroom in which he sat was surrounded by a rail on which there was a sign stat-
ing: "Reserved for Colored." He was also not allowed to use the desks in the 
library reading room, but forced to sit at a designated desk. Nor was he permitted 
to eat in the school cafeteria at the same time as other students. Oklahoma main-
tained that these separations were "merely nominal"; they did not detract from 
the fact that appellant used the same facilities as students of other races. The 
Court was not impressed. Indeed, in the course of striking down these restrictions 
in Mclaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Court seemed 
to shake the very foundations of the "separate but equal" doctrine: 
[These restrictions] signify that the State, in administering the facilities it 
affords for professional and graduate study, sets Mc Laurin apart from the other 
students. The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective gradu-
ate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in 
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his pro-
fession .... 
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position when these restric-
tions are removed, for he may still be set apart by his fellow students. This we think 
irrelevant. There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restric-
tions imposed by the state which -prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, 
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such 
bar. ... The removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily abate individual 
and group predilections, prejudices and choices. But at the very least, the state will 
not be depriving appellant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow stu-
dents on his own merits.'' 
;305 U.S. at 349. 
'332 U.S. at 632-33. 
"339 U.S. at 641. 
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The "separate but equal" doctrine was further battered by another case 
handed down the same day, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which held 
that a new law school set up by Texas for Blacks did not-could not, 
really-provide equal protection of the laws. By taking into account human rela-
tionships, social experiences and other intangible but significant differences 
between the new state law school for Blacks and the existing one for whites, the 
Court all but said that no "separate" school for Blacks could possibly be "equal": 
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far 
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but 
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include 
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of 
the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. . . . 
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware 
that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for legal 
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and insti-
tutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law 
would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas 
and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned. The law school to which 
Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body members of the 
racial groups which number 85% of the population of the State and include most of 
the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will 
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a sub-
stantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the 
education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if 
admitted to the University of Texas Law School. 111 
As the late Edmond Cahn has pointed out, "If you wish a judge to overturn a 
settled and established rule of law, you must convince both his mind and his emo-
tions, which together in indissociable blend constitute his sense of injustice."11 The 
Sweatt and Mclaurin cases, he argues persuasively, supplied the intellectual and 
emotive conditions for the School Desegregation cases of 1954. 
Texas' contentions might have seemed plausible to the Court, wrote Cahn, "if 
the school involved had not happened to be a school of law. Law was the only dis-
cipline that the judges understood thoroughly, the only one in which each consid-
ered himself wiser than any pedagogic expert." And if Sweatt suggested to the 
Justices' minds that "separate but equal" should be transformed into "separate 
therefore unequal," Mclaurin "provided the propulsive power of empathy and 
indignation." Cahn continued: 
111/d. at 634. As former Justice Tom Clark recently observed, after Sweatt and 
Mc Laurin were on the books, calling Plessy still "established doctrine" in public education 
"is but dealing with shadows rather than substance. * * * [Passages in these higher educa-
tion cases] were a premonition of what was to come in public grade and high school segre-
gation! Indeed, they were specifically used by the Chief Justice in Brown [347 U.S. at 494] 
when he said of the doctrine of Sweatt and Mc Laurin that their findings 'apply with added 
force to children in grade and high schools.' " Clark, Book Review, 36 University of Chi-
cago Law Review 239,241 (1968). 
'1 The Predicament of Democratic Man 129 (New York, 1962) (Delta Book ed.). 
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What Oklahoma did . . . was to furnish the Court with a living tableau, an 
animated epitome of segregation that even the most insensitive could easily compre-
hend. For unlike other members of his race, McLaurin had not remained conven-
iently out of sight in his own schoolyard; he had entered the precincts of the white 
people and had asked to qualify for the highest academic degree in Education. And 
once within the university, in the name of "Education" and under the orders of the 
state and its chief educational officers, how was he treated?'" 
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In the wake of Sweatt and Mclaurin, "all over the South, white boards of 
education ... began crash programs of Negro school building, calculated, as 
Governor Byrnes of South Carolina frankly confessed, 'to remedy a hundred 
years of neglect' of Negro education, Jest the Supreme Court 'take matters out of 
the state's hands.' "' 1 Although southern lawyers were to allude to these frenzied 
spending programs repeatedly in the School Desegregation oral arguments, "they 
came too late to deter either Negroes in their quest for equality or the Supreme 
Court in its role as the major organ for the enforcement of equality before the law. 
Accordingly, at the very time that the first serious measures were being taken to 
convert the fiction of separate but equal into physical reality, suits were pending 
which were to seal its doom."' 4 
As the transcript of the oral arguments in the Brown case amply illustrates, 
many able lawyers participated in the five School Segregation cases. But the prin-
cipal antagonists were John W. Davis and Thurgood Marshall. Davis, the Demo-
crats' nominee for President in 1924, was a magnificent legal advocate.'' If he lost 
the School Segregation case, it was only because in 1954 no lawyer could have 
won it. And although he Jost, he left no doubt why he was reputed to be the leading 
advocate of his time. This is a sample: 
[I]t has been accepted that where there is a pronounced dissent from previous 
opinions in constitutional matters, mere difficulty in amendment leaves the Court to 
bow to that change of opinion more than it would of matters of purely private rights. 
But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, sometime to every principle 
comes a moment of repose when it has been so often announced, so confidently relied 
upon, so long continued, that it passes the limits. of judicial discretion and disturb-
ance. 
That is the opinion which we held when we filed our former brief in this case. 
We relied on the fact that this Court had not once but seven times, I think it is, pro-
nounced in favor of the "separate but equal" doctrine. 
We relied on the fact that the courts of last appeal of some sixteen or eighteen 
States have passed upon the validity of the "separate but equal" doctrine vis-a-vis the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
We relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 segregated its 
schools in the District of Columbia. 
12 Id. at 130-32. 
''Kelly, supra note 2, at 256. 
"Robert Harris, The Quest for Equality 139-40 (New York, 1960). 
,-'In a recent discussion of appellate advocacy, Judge Rifkind remembered "at least 
one judge who said to me that whenever he heard John W. Davis argue a case, he positively 
closed his mind to his argument for at least a week. He wanted the magic of Davis' voice to 
subside before he put his mind to the case." Charpentier ed., Counsel on Appeal 2 I I (New 
York, 1968). 
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We relied on the fact that twenty-three of the ratifying States-I think my fig-
ures are right, I am not sure-had by legislative action evinced their conviction that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not offended by segregation, and we said in effect 
that that argument-and I am bold enough to repeat it here now-that in the lan-
guage of Judge Parker in his opinion below, after that had been consistent history for 
over three-quarters of a century, it was late indeed in the day to disturb it on any 
theoretical or sociological basis. We stand on that proposition. 1 ,a 
Davis' argument was carefully organized, and his urbaneness and splendid 
rhetoric is shown again, and again in the record. When one adds what all ob-
servers call the magic of his voice, the total effect was almost 
-almost-irresistible. Davis said in his peroration: 
Let me say this for the State of South Carolina. It does not come here, as Thad 
Stevens would have wished, in sack cloth and ashes. It believes that its legislation is 
not offensive to the Constitution of the United States. 
It is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its 
children of whatever race or color. It is convinced that the happiness, the progress 
and the welfare of these children is best promoted in segregated schools, and it thinks 
it a thousand pities that by this controversy there should be urged the return to an 
experiment which gives no more promise of success today than when it was written 
into their Constitution during what I call the tragic era. 
I am reminded-and I hope it won't be treated as a reflection on anybody-of 
Aesop's fable of the dog and the meat: The dog, with a fine piece of meat in his 
mouth, crossed a bridge and saw the shadow in the stream and plunged for it and lost 
both substance and shadow. 
Here is equal education, not promised, not prophesied, but present. Shall it be 
thrown away on some fancied question of racial prestige? 
It is not my part to offer advice to the appellants and their supporters or sym-
pathisers, and certainly not to the learned counsel. No doubt they think what they 
propose is best, and I do not challenge their sincerity in any particular period but I 
entreat them to remember the age-old motto that the best is often the enemy of the 
good. 1'1 
As Justice John Harlan has said, "Each lawyer must proceed according to his 
own lights." 1~ Although his organization was not nearly as tight as Davis' nor his 
presentation nearly as polished, Marshall was a powerful advocate in his own way. 
This was especially so on rebuttal where, perhaps stimulated by the sting of his 
opponents' argument, he really seemed to warm to his task. The following is an 
example of his earthy, homey touch: 
Those same kids in Virginia and South Carolina-and I have seen them do 
it-they play in the streets together, they play on their farms together, they go down 
the road together, they separate to go to school, they come out of school and play 
ball together. They have to be separated in school. 
There is some magic to it. You can have them voting together, you can have 
them not restricted because of law in the houses they live in. You can have them 
1 
·, Seep. 215 infra. 
'"Seep. 216-17 infra. 
10 John M. Harlan, "The Role of Oral Argument" in Westin ed., The Supreme Court: 
Views from Inside 57, 58 (New York, 1961). 
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going to the same state university and the same college, but if they go to elementary 
and high school, the world will fall apart. 18 
Marshall was no less aware than Davis that, particularly in a great case, the 
advocate must "always go for the jugular vein."19 If Davis the master craftsman 
told the Court how to write an opinion reaffirming Plessy, Marshall, spokesman 
for an oppressed race, never let the Justices forget why they had to overrule it. Nor 
was he about to let the Justices forget that the Court and the Constitution, as well 
as his own cause, were on trial: 
They can't take race out of this case. From the day this case was filed until this 
moment, nobody has in any form or fashion, despite the fact I made it clear in the 
opening argument that I was relying on it, done anything to distinguish this statute 
from the Black Codes, which they must admit-because nobody can dispute, say 
anything anybody wants to say, one way or the other-the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to deprive the States of power to enforce Black Codes or anything else 
like it. 
We charge that [the challenged state laws] are Black Codes. They obviously are 
Black Codes if you read them. They haven't denied that they're Black Codes, so if 
the Court wants to very narrowly decide this case, they can decide it on that point. 
So whichever way it is done, the only way that this Court can decide this case in 
opposition to our position, is that there must be some reason which gives the State 
the right to make a classification that they can make in regard to nobody else [but] 
Negroes, and we submit the only way to arrive at this decision is to find that for some 
reason Negroes are inferior to all other human beings. 
Nobody will stand in the Court and urge that, and in order to arrive at the deci-
sion that they want us to arrive at, there would have to be some recognition of a rea-
son why of all of the multitudinous groups of people in this country you have to single 
out Negroes and give them this separate treatment. 
It can't be because of slavery in the past, because there are very few groups in 
this country that haven't had slavery some place back in the history of their groups. 
It can't be color because there are Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue 
eyes, and they are just as segregated as the colored man. 
The only thing it can be is an inherent determination that the people who were 
formerly in slavery, regardless of anything else, shall be kept as near that stage as is 
1'See p. 239 infra. Marshall's reference to the state university and college must have 
been quite deliberate. Years earlier Charles Houston and other NAACP lawyers had 
decided upon the strategem of an "indirect attack" on school segregation by law suits forc-
ing the admission of Blacks to Southern graduate and professional schools, in part because 
Southern states did not even pretend to offer "equality" at this educational level and in part 
because providing genuinely equal facilities at this level would be enormously expensive, 
but also because they were persuaded that the South somehow regarded integration in 
higher education far less invidious than in primary and secondary schools. Years later, 
Marshall is reported to have commented: "These racial supremacy boys somehow think 
that little kids of six or seven are going to get funny ideas about sex and marriage just from 
going to school together, but for some equally funny reason youngsters in law school aren't 
supposed to feel that way. We didn't get it but we decided that if that was what the South 
believed, then the best thing for the moment was to go along." Kelly, supra note 2, at 
253-54. 
1''J. W. Davis, "The Argument of an Appeal," 26 American Bar Association Journal 
895,897 (1940). 
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possible, and now is the time, we submit, that this Court should make it clear that 
that is not what our Constitution stands for."" 
THE COURT AND THE CONGRESS 
If one who was still in law school when the School Segregation cases were 
being argued may second-guess a master of his profession, I venture to say that 
John W. Davis made at least one mistake. On the eve of Brown the odds were 
high that Plessy would be overruled, but, if not, it was very unlikely that the old 
case would be reaffirmed. Rather, the Court would probably have taken a third 
course-avoided a head-on confrontation with the equities of Marshall's position 
by treating the issue as a "political question" to be resolved by Congress under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: "The Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 
Such an "evasive solution would itself have created new law, since hitherto, for 
seventy-five years, Congress had left it to the Court to develop the content of the 
equal-protection guarantee." But the South's best chance, however small, was 
that the Court, inhibited by the magnitude of the issue and the difficulties of 
enforcement, might pass the buck to Congress, which "would have been some-
thing of an Alphonse-Gaston game, with no one going through the door."21 
Despite the apparent interest of both Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in 
such a line of reasoning, neither Davis on the reargument nor his colleague Justin 
Moore on the original argument wanted to argue that although the equal protec-
tion clause, of its own force, did not prohibit school segregation" 1 a, Congress 
could invalidate such segregation, and, in effect, expand the substantive scope of 
the clause, by enacting appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
MR. DAVIS: ... Section 5 is not a Trojan Horse which opened to Congress 
a wide field in which Congress might expand the boundaries of the article itself. 
JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. Davis, would not the "necessary and proper" 
clause apply to the [Fourteenth] Amendment as well as to the enumerated powers of 
the instrument itself? In other words, if Congress should say that in order to accom-
plish the purposes of equality in the other fields the abolition of segregation was 
necessary, as a "necessary and proper" measure, would this not come under it, or 
might it not come under the "necessary and proper" clause? 
MR. DA VIS: Well, if you can imagine a necessary and proper clause which 
would enforce the provisions of this article by dealing with matter which is not within 
the scope of the article itself, which I think is a contradiction in terms, that is a para-
dox. Congress could do what the Amendment did not warrant under the guise of 
enforcing the Amendment. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: But you can look for the "necessary and prop-
er" clause to determine whether it is something appropriate within the Amendment. 
'"Seep. 239-40 infra. 
'
1 Paul Freund, "Storm Over the American Supreme Court," 21 Modern Law Review 
345, 351 (1958). See also Charles Black, The People and the Court 139-42 (New York, 
1960) (Spectrum Book ed.); Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law," 73 Harvard law Review I, 32 (1959). 
'
1 a Seep. 9 3-94 infra. 
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MR. DA VIS: ... [To] interpret the Amendment as including something that 
it does not include is not to interpret the Amendment but is to amend the Amend-
ment, which is beyond the power of the Court.'" 
The questions raised by Justice Frankfurter and Jackson above, and in the 
original oral arguments, foreshadow Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), 
applying Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to uphold §4(e) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, prohibiting the application of an English literacy requirement 
to any prospective voter who has completed six grades in an American-flag school 
in which the language of instruction was other than English, whether or not, apart 
from the federal act, such a state requirement would violate equal protection. A 
7~2 majority, speaking through Justice Brennan, took the position that "by 
including Section 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provi-
sion applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed 
in the Necessary and Proper Clause."2 i 
SYMBOL AND CATALYST FOR A REVOLUTION 
If I may make another criticism of a master, let me suggest that one line of 
Davis' argument would have been better left unsaid: "shall ['equal,' albeit sepa-
rate, education] be thrown away on some fancied question of racial prestige?"" 4 
Many a white must have regarded this question quite appropriate. Disrupt long-
established customs and life patterns for what? Just to accomodate some status-
seeking Blacks? (No, to afford them the minimal dignity and respect to which 
every American is entitled.) Whites, certainly northern whites, are much less 
conscious of their color than are Blacks of theirs-and the stigma it connotes. The 
many whites who more or less take their whiteness and treatment as full human 
beings for granted-who have never felt, if they have even thought about, what it 
means always to be confined to the back of the bus-may well have wondered: 
Why do Blacks get so worked up about mere social amenities? Why do they rave 
so about their rights? Why are they so sensitive? Marshall's rebuttal was: 
I understand the South's lawyers to say that it is just a little feeling on the part 
of Negroes-they don't like segregation. As Mr. Davis said yesterday, the only thing 
the Negroes are trying to get is prestige. 
Exactly correct. Ever since the Emancipation Proclamation, the Negro has 
been trying to get what was recognized in Strauder v. West Virginia [1880], which is 
the same status as anybody else regardless of race." 
Of course, racial prestige was not the only thing at stake in Brown-but it 
was a great deal. As sociologist Joseph Gusfield has pointed out in his illuminating 
study of Prohibition and Temperance, the instrumental effects of governmental 
action may be slight compared to the response which it entails as a symbol. So 
long as men's regard for status, respect, honor and prestige are real and impor-
tant, symbolic action will be real and important. And, though he treated this 
"See p. 214 infra. 
''384 U.S. at 650. 
"Seep. 216 infra. 
,·,seep. 236 infra. 
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aspect flippantly, Davis knew it every bit as well as Marshall. It is because politi-
cal symbolism may affect the status order-may contribute to a glorification or 
degradation of one group in opposition to others within the society-that "the 
struggle to control the symbolic actions of government is often as bitter and as 
fateful as the struggle to control its tangible effects. " 26 
White southerners and Black men, as do all men, live by symbols. And in 
large measure the School Desegregation cases were so fiercely contested and then 
so bitterly resisted because school segregation is a special symbol. Indeed, to the 
southern Black this racist institution must have seemed the epitome of American 
hypocrisy. Had not Horace Mann called education "the great equalizer of the 
conditions of men?" Had not Justice Frankfurter called the public school "the 
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our 
common destiny?"" 7 Were Blacks supposed to be less aware than other Americans 
that "education is a fetish of our country; we have believed it somehow to be a 
magic cure-all."28 
The Blacks understood, no less than did white southerners, that for the 
latter-or more accurately, for whites everywhere-to treat them as though they 
were outside the community of man it was essential to nourish and preserve the 
stereotype of Blacks, the stereotype that-
depicts Negroes as relatively unteachable, and therefore ignorant; as insensitive 
to the demands of abstract ideals, and therefore less troubled by discrimination than 
the white man; as motivated solely by appetite for the creature comforts, and there-
fore appeasable with access to fried fish, liquor and women; as devoid of moral fibre, 
and therefore predisposed to crime ... [and] that segregation's significant function 
is not to deliver an insult but to preserve the group stereotype by minimizing contact 
between the races in situations where they would necessarily see and deal with each 
other as individuals, and by putting the official imprimatur on the proposition that 
Negroes and whites differ in a legally material way."' 
Similarly, Anthony Lewis has observed: 
That racial separation should carry more emotional weight in schools than 
elsewhere was understandable: Attendance was compulsory, and in school children 
,,; Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance 
Movement 167 (New York, 1963) See also id. at 22, 173. 
'"Frankfurter, J., joined by Jackson, Rutledge and Burton, JJ., concurring in 
McCullom v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203,231 (1948). Compare W. E. B. DuBois, 
"My Evolving Program for Negro Freedom," in R. Logan ed., What the Negro Wants 68 
(New York, 1944): "The underlying philosophy of our public school system is that the 
education of all children together at public expense is the best and surest path to 
democracy." 
'"Roy Wilkins, "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in What the Negro Wants 123. 
"'Louis Lusky, "The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism," 13 Buffalo Law Review 450, 
451-52 (1964). See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 657 (20th ann. ed. New 
York, 1962): "Although the Southerner will not admit it, he is beset by guilt-feelings, 
knowing as he does that his attitude toward the Negroes is un-American and un-Christian. 
Hence he needs to dress his systematic ignorance in stereotypes. * * * [The Southern 
whites] need the ceremonial distance to prevent the Negroes' injuries and sufferings from 
coming to their attention." 
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of an impressionable age were exposed to a culture. Intermingling of the races could 
not help but affect their outlook. Putting it another way, any breakdown in school 
segregation necessarily endangered the perpetuation of the southern myth that the 
Negro is by nature culturally distinct and inferior. And there was the fear-surely 
felt deeply by many in the South, however others regarded it-that school integration 
was a step toward intermarriage. 
It was these reasons that led Hodding Carter, one of the most enlightened 
voices in Mississippi, to write a year before the School decision that a Supreme Court 
ruling against segregation would be "revolutionary" in character."' 
"Revolutionary in character?" Has it really turned out that way? 
Up through the 1962-63 school year, less than l per cent of Black students 
attended school with whites in the eleven states of the old Confederacy. In the 
1965-66 school year-in no small measure as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and guidelines promulgated by the United States Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare-the percentage increased to 6 per cent. 11 Local resistance 
has occasionally taken the form of spectacular open defiance, but far more effec-
tive have been the less flamboyant "guerilla activities" of public officials. 1:! 
The pace of desegregation, of course, has been most uneven. During the 
1966-67 school year, although more than 90 per cent of Black pupils still attended 
all-Black schools in the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and South Carolina, more than 80 per cent attended schools which were 
less than 95 per cent Black in the border States of Delaware, Kentucky, and West 
Virginia. Indeed, in Kentucky a majority of Black children attend schools which 
are less than 20 per cent Black. Although the rate of desegregation has accelerated 
almost everywhere in the South in recent years (the pace has been heartening in 
some states), the grim facts are that more Black students still attend all-Black 
schools in southern and border states than they did at the time of the first Brown 
decision-and this amounts to more than 75 per cent of all Black students in such 
states. Is this the stuff of "revolution?" 
Even in the North, because of housing segregation, most Blacks, although 
legally eligible to attend white schools, are still in segregated ones. Indeed, in too 
many northern communities, because whites are moving away or sending their 
children to private or parochial schools, we are experiencing "resegregation." And 
most of the relatively few Black students who are no longer "separate" are not yet 
"equal" or meaningfully "integrated. "'11 
The statistical story is disappointing, but it is only a small part of the whole 
story. The consequences of Brown cannot begin to be measured by cold statistics. 
Nor, although the Supreme Court quickly applied (or extended) the principle of 
111 Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution 5 (New 
York, 1964). 
'1 See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Southern School Desegregation 5-9 ( 1967). 
See also Robert Carter, "The Warren Court and Desegregation," 67 Michigan Law 
Review 237,245 (1968). 
1
' See generally Louis Lusky, "Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem 
in Nullification," 63, Columbia Law Review 1163 ( 1963). 
uSee generally Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto 111-153 (New York, 1965); Charles 
Silberman, Crisis in Black and White 249-307 (New York, 1964) (Vintage ed.). 
xxiv ARGUMENT 
its 1954 ruling to other public facilities-such as public transportation, parks, 
and beaches;i; can its consequences be measured by the number of times it has 
been cited in other judicial opinions. Regardless of its practical, tangible, direct 
effects, and its judicial progeny, the symbolic quality of the decision was immeas-
urable; "the psychological dimensions of America's race relations problems were 
completely recast"; the "indirect consequences" "awesome."3 '' It stimulated men 
everywhere-corporate executives, union officials, clergymen, hospital adminis-
trators, university executive officers and faculty members-to rethink and, some-
times at least, to reshape their policies. "Its educative and moral impact in areas 
other than public education and, in fact, its whole thrust toward equality and 
opportunity for all men has been of enormous importance."i6 This impact and 
thrust, for example, contributed mightily to the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964, 1968, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965-
demonstrating once again that constructive political action "flows in no small part 
from an awareness of basic principles concretely illustrated in court decisions and 
constantly explained in opinions circulating among a wide audience_,,i, And it 
greatly accelerated, perhaps even precipitated, the "revolution" in constitutional-
criminal procedure. For "it is hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the 
challenge of guaranteeing the rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups to 
equality before the law and at the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invi-
dious discrimination between rich and poor which existed in the criminal 
process. ,,,rn 
White America was never to be the same after Brown. Nor was Black Amer-
ica. As author Louis Lomax put it: 
It would be impossible for a white person to understand what happened within 
black breasts on that Monday. An ardent segregationist has called it "Black Mon-
day." He was so right, but for reasons other than the ones he advances: That was the 
day we won; the day we took the white man's laws and won our case before an all-
white Supreme Court with a Negro lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, as our chief counsel. 
And we were proud."' 
That the case generated a feeling of hope and momentum is evidenced by 
such Black responses to a national poll, years later, as: "It started the ball roll-
ing"; "the Supreme Court gave us heart to fight.""' 
"For a collection of Supreme Court and lower court cases, since Brown. holding racial 
segregation invalid in numerous areas, see W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar & J. Choper, Consti-
tutional law: Cases, Comments & Questions 1228 (2d ed. 1967). 
''Carter,supra note 31, at 247. 
"'John Kaplan, "Comment on School Desegregation," 64 Columbia Law Review 223, 
228 (1964). 
"Charles Wynzanski, "Constitutionalism: Limitation and Affirmation," in Suther-
land ed., Government Under Law 473,486 (New York, 1956). 
"A. K. Pye, "The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure," 67 Michigan Law Review 
249,256 (1968). 
'"The Negro Revolt 84 (New York, 1963) (Signet ed.) 
'"These were typical responses to a 1963 Newsweek national poll which found two-
thirds of all Blacks crediting the Supreme Court for their biggest breakthroughs. See 
Thomas Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American IO (New York, 1964). 
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Last year, looking back at the School Desegregation cases, in which he 
played a major role, Robert Carter, former NAACP General Counsel, sadly 
observed that "Brown has promised more than it could give." Yet few commenta-
tors have better articulated how much it did give: 
Blacks were no longer supplicants seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as 
full-fledged members of the human race; no longer were they appealing to morality, 
to conscience, to white America's better instincts. They were entitled to equal treat-
ment as a right under the law; when such treatment was denied, they were being 
deprived-in fact robbed-of what was legally theirs. As a result, the Negro was 
propelled into a stance of insistent militancy. Now he was demanding-fighting to 
secure and possess what was rightfully his. The appeal to morality and to conscience 
still was valid, of course, but in a nation that was wont to describe itself as a society 
ruled by law, blacks had now perhaps the country's most formidable claim to fulfill-
ment of their age-old dream of equal status-fulfillment of their desire to become full 
and equal participants in the mainstream of American life." 
Southern conservatives understood perhaps better than northern liberals that 
revolution feeds on itself and that the time to stop one is at the beginning, not the 
end. But they couldn't. That is why Brown is a momentous decision. 
Southern conservatives knew, too, that one Black success would lead to other 
Black demands. "They were undoubtedly wrong in thinking that they could hold 
the line by opposing all Negro demands, but the northern liberals were probably 
equally wrong in thinking that they could contain the Negro revolution by legal 
concessions. " 4 ' 
I realize that revolutions do not begin at a particular point in time; that they 
are not made, but come, out of the past. Nor am I unaware that many factors 
were working for change in American race relations on the eve of Brown. "But 
revolutions require a spark, a catalyst. For the revolution in American race rela-
tions, this was the School Segregation case." Anthony Lewis said further: 
The struggle to carry out the Supreme Court's decision created a climate that 
encouraged the Negro to protest against segregation on buses, to demand coffee at a 
lunch counter, to stand in long, patient lines waiting to take a biased test for the right 
to vote. It was easy to say, as many observers did during the [1954-64] decade, that it 
would be more logical for Negroes in the South to concentrate on obtaining the bal-
lot because political power would open the way to all other rights. But that was only 
true in the abstract. In the real world the right to vote was too remote an idea to 
arouse the Negro of the South from apathy and fear. It took the drama of school 
desegregation, and then of the protest movements, to make the possibility of freedom 
come alive; then Negroes began demanding en masse the ballot to which the law had 
said they were entitled. 
* * * * * 
However discouraged one may be at the continuing reality of discrimination, he 
should remember that this country is at least on the right course-and that the law 
put it there.' 1 
''Carter, supra note 31, at 247. 
12 James Reston, "The Shame of the Cities" (1966), in Sketches in the Sand 370 (New 
York, 1967). 
11 Lewis, supra note 30, at 5, 8-9. 
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DUBOIS AND SEPARATE SCHOOLS 
In the course of his spirited defense of the "separate but equal" doctrine, 
John W. Davis turned for support to Dr. W. E. B. DuBois.-
Perhaps the most constant and vocal opponent of Negro oppression of any of 
his race in the country. 
Says he: 
"It is difficult to think of anything more important for the development of a 
people than proper training for their children; and yet I have repeatedly seen wise and 
loving colored parents take infinite pains to force their little children into schools 
where the white children, white teachers, and white parents despised and resented the 
dark chile, made mock of it, neglected or bullied it, and literally rendered its life a 
living hell. Such parents want their children to "fight" this thing out,-but, dear God, 
at what a cost!" 
He goes on: 
"We shall get a finer, better balance of spirit; an infinitely more capable and 
rounded personality by putting children in schools where they are wanted, and where 
they are happy and inspired, than in thrusting them into hells where they are ridi-
culed and hated.""' 
The irony of it! For the South to cite one who had been called "the most vital 
and compelling figure in the Negro world"4 '-one who, a full half-century earlier, 
had warned Booker T. Washington and other Black leaders that "the way for a 
people to gain their reasonable rights is not by voluntarily throwing them away 
and insisting that they do not want them""" -for the proposition that Black people 
did not want desegregation. 
If Davis was implying, as he seemed to be, that if the militant DuBois were 
opposed to school desegregation, then surely so were virtually all other members 
of the Black race, he was plainly wrong. From the white South's viewpoint, the 
best that could be said was that Blacks were divided on this issue. Indeed, DuBois 
himself had pointed out, "In this matter of segregation I was touching an old and 
bleeding sore in Negro thought. From the eighteenth century down the Negro 
intelligentsia has regarded segregation as the visible badge of their servitude and 
as the object of their unceasing attack.,,.~ 
Why are Blacks more fungible than Jews or Irishmen-or white Protestants? 
There are some prominent members of nonconforming minority religious groups, 
no doubt, who do not (or pretend not) to mind religious instruction in public 
school classrooms or the invocation of "official prayers" there, but how can they 
bind those who do object? How can any Black, however eminent, speak for the 
BlackT 8 How can any Black, however renowned, prevent other Blacks from 
"Seep. 61 infra quoting from DuBois, "Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?," 4 
Journal Negro Education 328, 330-31 (1935). 
';See Preface to E. M. Rudwick, W. £. B. DuBois: Propagandist of the Negro Protest 
(New York, 1968). 
";"Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others," in The Souls of Black Folk 51 (New 
York, 1903) (Crest Reprint). 
,:DuBois, Dusk of Dawn 305 (New York, 1940) (Schoken ed.). 
"See S. A. Brown, "Count Us In," in What the Negro Wants 336-37. 
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asserting their constitutional rights? Did not the Court have to tear down the wall, 
regardless of the number of Blacks determined to climb over the rubble? It seemed 
sufficient, therefore, to remind Davis, as Marshall did, that "If all of the people in 
the State of South Carolina and most of the Negroes still wanted segregated 
schools ... any individual Negro has a right, if it is a constitutional right, to 
assert it. "~ 9 
Inasmuch as many Black activists view DuBois as a "symbol of dedicated, 
uncompromising militance,".' 11 it may be profitable to dwell for a moment on what 
his views really were on school segregation-and why. 
To begin with, his apparent preference for segregated schools was essentially 
a product of despair, not choice. In the long run DuBois, too, wanted all color bars 
down, but that day would only come when "the majority of Americans were per-
suaded of the rightness of our cause.".' 1 And he eventually became convinced that 
the white world was so resolutely opposed to racial equality that that day was far 
away-"many years, perhaps many generations."·"" The long run was too long. In 
the long run DuBois and his contemporaries would be dead and their children 
graduates of segregated schools. 
In the meantime, his people had to come to terms with the brutal facts of 
racism. They had to fight for a fair share of public funds for Black schools and 
transform them, if possible, from "simply separate schools, forced on us by grim 
necessity" to "centers of a new and beautiful effort at human education".''-and 
otherwise develop their own facilities and resources as best they could. In the 
meantime, they had to do more than dream the impossible dream. DuBois lived 
long enough to see the School Desegregation case of 1954 and to exclaim, "I have 
seen the impossible happen_,,-,, 
Once "the present attitude of white America toward black America" is rec-
ognized, insisted DuBois in 1935, "there is no room for argument as to whether 
the Negro needs separate schools or not. The plain fact faces us, that either he will 
have separate schools or he will not be educated.,,,-, 
The NAACP, he maintained, "was not, never had been, and never could be 
an organization that took an absolute stand against race segregation of any sort 
under all circumstances. This would be a stupid stand in the face of clear and 
incontrovertible facts .... What we did say was 
Whenever we found that an increase in segregation was in the interest of the 
Negro race, naturally we had to advocate it. We had to advocate better teachers for 
Negro schools and larger appropriation of funds. We had to advocate a segregated 
'"Seep. 65 infra. 
··"Rudwick, supra note 45, at 295. 
'
1 Dusk of Dawn 304. 
'' Ibid, See also id at 309: "I am certain that for many generations American Negroes 
in the United States have got to accept separate medical institutions. They may dislike it; 
they may and ought to protest against it; nevertheless it will remain for a long time their 
only path to health, to education, to economic survival." 
·,' DuBois, supra note 44, at 332, 334-35. 
''DuBois, "We Rejoice and Tell the World ... but We Must Go Further," National 
Guardian, May 31, 1954, p. 5. 
'' DuBois, supra note 44, at 328-29. 
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camp for the training of Negro officers in the [First] World War. We had to advocate 
group action of Negro voters in elections. We had to advocate all sorts of organized 
movement among Negroes to fight oppression and in the long run end segregation. 
So long as we were fighting a color line, we must strive by color organization. 
We have no choice.·," 
In the very article that John W. Davis quoted, DuBois made plain that he 
would "welcome" a time when "racial animosities and class lines will be so obli-
terated that separate schools will be anachronisms.,,·,; -Twenty years later he was 
to "rejoice" at the overruling of the "separate but equal" doctrine·,,, for he was 
well aware that 
Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more natural basis 
for the education of all youth. It gives wider contacts; it inspires greater selfconfid-
ence; and suppresses the inferiority complex. But other things seldom are equal, and 
in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed 
school can offer..'" 
Lest we too hastily congratulate ourselves on the great distance we have 
traveled since 1935, the year DuBois made these grim observations, consider the 
sobering remarks of New York Times columnist James Reston, some thirty years 
later and ten years after the School Desegregation cases: 
It will not do to wait for total racial integration to make substantial improve-
ment in the schools still predominantly Negro .... [A] vast and expensive new effort 
will probably have to be made to make the predominantly Negro schools "equal" 
even if they are still largely "separate." This is opposed by some Negro leaders in the 
belief that making the predominantly separate Negro schools "equal" will weaken 
the fight against keeping them "separate." 
Yet it is fairly clear from the history of the last ten years that the fight for legal 
equality is insufficient. Educational equality must go with it, or at the end of another 
'"Dusk of Dawn 309-11. 
,; DuBois, supra note 44, at 328. 
"See note 53 supra. See also DuBois, "The Negro Since 1900: A Progress Report," 
N. Y. Times Magazine. Nov. 21, 1948, pp. 24, 59: "[The Negro] proposes to reach complete 
equality as an American citizen. And by equality he means abolition of separate schools, 
the disappearance of 'Jim Crow' travel; no segregation in public accommodations * * * 
[W]hether it takes thirty years or a thousand, equality is his goal and he will never stop until 
he reaches it." 
'" DuBois, supra note 44 at 335. Although DuBois dwelt on "chiefly negative argu-
ments for separate Negro institutions of learning based on the fact that in the majority of 
cases Negroes are not welcomed in public schools and universities nor treated as human 
beings," he also advanced "certain positive reasons due to the fact that American Negroes 
have, because of their history, group experiences and memories, a distinct entity, whose 
spirit and reactions demand a certain type of education for its development." Id. at 333. 
But this rested largely on the premises that certain studies, e.g .. the history of the Negro 
race in America, would seldom be found in white institutions and that a white bias per-
vaded white study of anthropology, psychology and other social sciences. Ibid. In any 
event, a desire for the availability of desegregrated public schools is not on a collision 
course with the view that "in history and the social sciences the Negro school and college 
has an unusual opportunity and role," id. at 334. 
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ten years we shall have a Negro generation with equal rights to jobs but few jobs, free 
access to restaurants and housing but no means to enjoy them, equal opportunity to 
vote but little understanding of the purpose of voting."" 
Although DuBois never realized how near at hand was the 1954 Supreme 
Court decision, his estimate of the "living hell" many a Black child would experi-
ence on entering a previously all-white school was closer to the mark. But for the 
South this brutal factor was to backfire badly. Not only did it fail to stay the 
Court's hand in 1954, it was to strengthen its hand in the grim, tense years which 
followed. If there was irony-when the principle had not yet been announced-in 
the South drawing on DuBois' writings for support, there was more irony-when 
the viability of the principle was still in doubt61-in the Black cause thriving on the 
visibility of the racism which DuBois had foreseen. 
For southern Black families, two Black psychiatrists have recently told us, 
"School ... was seen in a very special way. Beset on all sides by a cruel enemy, 
school was often primarily a refuge-a place of safety for those who were to be 
protected-and in a sense it was a case of women and children first."'; 2 But after 
Brown little Black boys and girls left their refuge to face the cruel enemy. 
The courage of these little pioneers of school desegregation inspired Blacks 
everywhere. And at a time when not a few northerners must have been growing a 
bit tired of it all-here as elsewhere people may go to great lengths to gratify 
reformers "in principle" only to find it rather tedious of them to insist on carrying 
principle to the point where it really bites-the ridicule, harrassment and hatred of 
the white adults who confronted these Black children mobilized northern opinion 
in support of the Court's decision. 
Few northerners would be misled any longer by "the entirely sincere protesta-
tions of many southerners that segregation is 'better' for the Negroes, is not 
intended to hurt them"; many would now understand "that what is meant is that it 
is better for the Negroes to accept a position of inferiority, at least for the indefi-
nite future. " 6 ' On seeing the fury of the mobs and hearing "the ugly, spitting curse 
"" "Education and Integration" in Sketches in the Sand 165-66 (New York, 1967). 
"' As Professor Alexander Bickel has observed, "the Supreme Court's law, the south-
ern leaders realized, could not in our system prevail-not merely in the very long run, but 
within the decade- * * * if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and 
received with indifference by the rest of the country." The Least Dangerous Branch 258 
(Indianapolis, 1962). Inasmuch as this was more or less the situation in 1956-7, at this 
point at least the outcome was still in doubt. Although Professor Bickel underscores the 
March 11, 1956 Southern Congressional Manifesto's heavy contribution to this sorry state 
of affairs, id. at 256-58; Bickel, "The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Pros-
pects," 64 Columbia Law Review 193,202 (1964); and no doubt the manifesto made defi-
ance of the Court and the Constitution "socially acceptable in the South," Anthony Lewis, 
Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution 45 (New York, 1964); I share 
Professor John Kaplan's view that the indifference of President Eisenhower in particular 
and the national political institutions in general probably did more to inhibit Southern 
moderates and to slow down the pace of desegregation than did the Manifesto. See Kaplan, 
"Comment on School Desegregation," 64 Columbia Law Review 223, 224-26 ( 1964) . 
.;'William H. Grier & Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage 124 (New York, 1968) (Bantam 
Book ed.) 
'''Charles Black, "The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions," 69 Yale Law Jour-
nal 421, (1960). 
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'Nigger!' ", the abstraction of racism was "concretized" on millions of televi-
sion screens and the "moral bankruptcy" and "shame" of the thing finally 
grasped." 4 The North was roused. And an aroused North meant an aroused Fed-
eral Government. 
Many campaigns of the Black Revolution remain to be won~for example, de 
facto segregation and massive educational and economical issues. But on the fif-
teenth anniversary of Brown, in large part thanks to those who did not spare us the 
gory details of "the southern way of life," the outcome of the campaign against 
legal, formal segregation of schools and other public facilities is no longer in 
doubt. 
There remain, to be sure, pockets of resistance, some discouragingly large, 
many bitterly defended. Flushing them all out will take not a few years and in the 
process, no doubt, more hate will be spewed and more blood spilled. But now this 
campaign is only a mopping-up operation. 
University of Michigan Law School 
March, 1969 
''' See generally Bickel, supra note 6 I, at 266-67; Lewis, supra, at 7-12. 
